A methodology for designing hybrid controllers for large scale, multiagent systems is presented. Our approach is based on optimal control and game theory. The hybrid design is seen as a game between two players: the control, which is to be chosen by the designer and the disturbances that encode the actions of other agents (in a multi-agent setting), the actions of high level controllers or the usual unmodeled environmental disturbances. The two players compete over cost functions that encode properties that the closed loop hybrid system needs to satisfy (e.g., safety). The control "wins" the game if it can keep the system "safe" for any allowable disturbance. The solution to the game theory problem provides the designer with continuous controllers as well as sets of safe states where the control "wins" the game. The sets of safe states are used to construct an interface to the discrete domain that guarantees the safe operation of the combined hybrid system. The design methodology is illustrated by means of examples.
Introduction
The demand for increased levels of automation and system integration have forced control engineers to deal with larger and more complicated systems. Moreover, recent technological advances, such as faster computers, cheaper and more reliable sensors and the integration of control considerations in the product design and manufacturing process, have made it possible to extend the practical applications of control to systems that were impossible to deal with in the past. To control large, complex systems engineers are usually forced to use a combination of continuous and discrete controllers. Continuous controllers are particularly useful as the interaction with the physical plant (through sensors and actuators) is essentially continuous. More-'Research supported by the Army Research Office under grant DAAH 04-95-1-0588 and the PATH program, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Berkeley, under MOU-135 and MOU-238.
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over, continuous models and powerful continuous control techniques have been developed and validated extensively in the past. On the other hand, discrete abstractions help to manage the complexity of the system, are convenient to compute with, and make it easier to introduce linguistic and qualitative information in the design process. Systems that incorporate both continuous and discrete dynamics are typically referred to as hybrid systems. The control of hybrid systems has attracted considerable attention both from the system theory [l, 2, 3, 4, 51 and the computer science point of view [S, 7, 81. However there are still a lot of questions to be answered.
A very interesting class of systems that are naturally suited for hybrid control are multiagent, scarce resource systems. Their characteristic is that many agents are trying to make optimum use of a congested, common resource. Examples include highway systems, where vehicles can be viewed as agents competing for scarce highway space-time and air traffic management systems where aircraft compete for air space and runway space. Typically in systems like these the optimum policy for each agent does not coincide with the "common good". Therefore, compromises need to be made. To achieve the common optimum we should ideally have a centralized control scheme that computes the global optimum and commands the agents accordingly. A centralized controller may be undesirable however as the design process will probably be very complicated, it is likely to be very computationally intensive, may be less reliable (the consequences can be catastrophic if the centralized controller is disabled) and the information that needs to be exchanged may be too large for the available communication capabilities. If a completely decentralized solution is too inefficient and a completely centralized solution is prohibitingly complex or expensive, an inbetween compromise will have to be sought. Such a compromise will feature semiautonomous agent operation. In this case each agent is trying to optimize its own usage of the resource and coordinates with neighboring agents in case there is a conflict of objectives.
It should be noted that semiautonomous agent control is naturally suited for hybrid designs, with each agent choosing its own optimal strategy at the continuous level and discrete coordination being used to resolve conflicts.
In this paper we present an algorithm for designing hierarchical, hybrid controllers for multi agent, large scale systems. The algorithm starts at the continuous level. Two factors affect the system evolution at this level, the control, that the designer has to determine and the disturbances that enter the system, over which we assume no control. We will distinguish three classes of disturbances: Class 1: Exogenous signals, such as unniodeled forces and torques in mechanical systems, sensor noise, etc. Class 2: Unmodeled dynamics. Class 3: The actions of other agents. Disturbances of Class 1 and 2 are standard in control theory. Class 3 will be the most interesting from the point of view of hybrid control. Recall that at this stage we are merely modeling the plant, therefore we assume no cooperation between the agents. As a result, each agent views the actions of its neighbors as uncontrollable disturbances. In the continuous domain, specifications about the closed loop system can be encoded in terms of cost functions. Acceptable performance can be encoded by means of thresholds on the final cost. Our objective is to derive a continuous design for the control inputs that guarantees performance despite the disturbances. If it turns out that the disturbance is such that the specifications can not be met for any controller the design fails. The only way to salvage the situation is to somehow limit the disturbance. For disturbances of Class 3 this may be possible by means of communication and coordination between the agents. The objective then is to come up with a discrete design that limits the disturbance so that a continuous design is feasible.
An ideal tool for this set up is game theory. In the game theoretic framework the control and the disturbances are viewed as adversaries in a game where the control seeks to improve system performance while the disturbance seeks to make it worse. If we set a threshold on the cost function to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable performance we can say that the control wins the game if the cost is below the threshold for any allowable disturbance, while the disturbance wins otherwise. The task of the designer is to find the best possible control and the worst possible disturbance. If the requirements are met for this pair, it is possible to obtain a satisfactory design (one such design is the best possible control). If the requirements are not satisfied the problem can not be solved as is, since there exists a choice of disturbance for which, no matter what the controller does, the closed loop system will fail to satisfy the requirements. Game theoretic ideas have already been applied in this context to problems with disturbances of Class 1 and 2 and quadratic cost functions. The resulting controllers are the I ! ? , or Lz optimal controllers (see for example [9] ).
The paper is arranged in four sections. In Section 2 an algorithm for producing hybrid controllers for a multi agent system is presented. The result is a hybrid controller which can, by design, guarantee certain properties for the closed loop system. 2 Game Theoretic Framework The difficulties in the design of hybrid controllers arize at the interaction between the discrete and continuous components. They are mainly due to inadequate abstraction of the continuous performance at the discrete level, which may result in the discrete controller issuing commands that are incompatible with the state of the continuous system. The results can be catastrophic as illustrated in [13] . We will try to overcome this difficulty by using game theory to generate continuous controllers and consistent discrete abstractions for the resulting closed loop system. For background material on game theory the reader is referred to [lL4].
Plant Model
The plant dynamics of an agent are assumed to be governed by a differential equation of the form:
Here z(t) E Rn represents the state, u ( t ) E Rm represents the input and d ( t ) € Rp represents any disturbance that affects the dynamics'. The behavior of the system at time t is assumed to be monitored through a set of outputs y ( t ) Rg. We assume that differential equation (1) has unique solutions and that the full state is available for feedback.
Physical considerations (such as actuator saturation) restrict the system evolution. These restrictions appear as constraints on the state, inputs and disturbances.
Here we restrict our attention to the case where the 'The design methodology can be modified to apply to systems where the state, input and disturbance evolve on appropriate manifolds and/or the continuous dynamics are described by difference equations. It is $so possible to modify our approach so that it applies to systems €or which the plant dynamics themselves are described by nontrivial hybrid systems (e.g. hopping robots 
In our framework for hierarchical control the desired performance will be specified by the discrete layer. The continuous layer will be responsible for the regulation, i.e. the selection of inputs U . An interface provides communication between the two layers, providing the continuous layer with the desired performance and the discrete layer with feedback on whether the requirements can be met. Here we will concentrate on the design of the continuous layer and the interface from continuous to discrete.
Discrete Layer
In terms of the continuous layer the discrete design will be represented by a sequence of desired way points yj" that the system output should track ( j is an integer) and a set of performance specifications ( J i , Ci), 5 Ci for all i = 1,. . . , N . We assume that the cost functions are ordered in the order of decreasing importance. Qualitatively, the most important cost functions encode properties such as safety while the least important ones encode properties such as resource utilization. The design should be such that more important requirements are not violated in favor of less important ones.
Continuous Layer
The following algorithm can be used to systematically construct hybrid low level controllers in this multiobjective setting:
Step 0: Let VO = X , U o ( z o ) =U and i = 1.
Step i: Assume the two player, zero sum dynamic game for Ji has a saddle solution (U:, df): The controller can be extended to values of the state outside V using a switching scheme:
The control law of ( 5 ) can easily be implemented by a hybrid automaton. This procedure must be repeated for each set point provided by the higher layer. The above algorithm is sound in theory but can run into technical difficulties when applied in practice as there is no guarantee that the dynamic games will have saddle solutions, there is no guarantee that the sets vl, (and consequently Ui(zo)) will be non-empty and there is no straight-forward way of computing Ui(zo).
Interface
The sets V are such that for all initial conditions in them all requirements on system performance are guaranteed. These sets impose conditions that the discrete switching scheme needs to satisfy. The discrete layer should not issue a new command (encoded by a way point) if the current state does not lie in the set V for the associated controller. Essentially, these sets offer a way of consistently abstracting the performance of the continuous layer.
It should be noted that, by construction, the sets Vi are nested. Therefore there is a possibility that an initial condition lies in Vi for some i = I,. . . , N' < N but not in V . This implies that certain requirements on the system performance (e.g., safety) can be satisfied, while others (e.g., efficient resource utilization) can not. This allows the discrete design some more freedom. For example, a new command may be issued if it is dictated by safety, even though it violates the requirements of efficiency. This construction provides a convenient way of modeling gradual performance degradation, where lower priority performance requirements are abandoned in favor of higher priority ones. It can be particularly useful for operation under degraded conditions, for example in the presence of faults [16] .
The overall continuous design including the interface is shown in Figure 1 . Switching of continuous controllers takes place at two levels. Assume that the discrete layer specifies two set points, A and B, and two objectives, for example safety and efficiency. For each set point, the game theoretic framework will produce optimal controllers2 for safety U; and efficiency along 2The controllers will depend on the set point. To avoid additional subscripts we will ignore this dependency in the notation. As illustrated above, switching between these two controllers will be carried out depending on the current value of the state (represented in the figure as an input u3 to the switching scheme). After receiving a new set point command from the discrete layer, the interface will switch to a new controller if the system state be- 3 Example: The Train-Gate Controller In this section we illustrate how the approach developed in Section 2 can be applied to a classic example from the timed automata verification literature, the train gate controller.
Problem Statement
The train-gate set up is shown in Figure 2 . We will work on the problem formulation of [MI. For simplic- A road crossing is located at 2 2 = 0 on the train track.
It is guarded by a gate that, when lowered, prevents cars from crossing the tracks. Let 21 E [O', 90'1 denote the angle of the gate in degrees. Assume that the gate dynamics are described by the first order differential equation: 1
x 1 = --21 + U 2 where U is the input to be chosen by the designer of the gate controller. The design of [18] is based on discrete sensor measurements. We assume that there are two sensors located at distances SI and S 2 respectively on the track. The sensor at 5' 1 detects when the train is approaching the crossing, while the one at $2 detects when it has moved away. For the control problem to have a solution we will assume that -4 < S 1 < 0 < S 2 < 4. Two requirements are imposed on the design: safety and throughput. For safety it is required that the gate must be lowered (below a certain threshold) whenever the train reaches the crossing. This can be encoded as: 4 t ) = 0 3 2 1 < Cl The value Cl = 10' will be used in subsequent analysis.
For throughput it is required that the gate should be opened whenever it is safe to do so, to maximize the number of cars that get to cross the tracks.
Game Theoretic Formulation
The problem can immediately be cast in the game theoretic framework. The two players (agents) are the gate controller, U and the train speed (disturbance), d. The dynamics are linear in the state and affine in the two inputs. Let 5 = [ X I 2 2 I T E R2 denote the state:
The state is constrained to lie in the set: 
The requirement for throughput can be encoded by a number of cost functions. A simple one is:
Im
Minimizing 2 2 implies that the gate is open for as long as possible.
Controller Design
We can now apply the algorithm of Section 2. The detailed analysis can be found in [19] . Our first goal is to find the safe set of initial conditions and the control that makes them safe. Fortunately, the dynamics are simple enough to allow us to guess a candidate saddle solution: To introduce the throughput in the design note that, by Lemma 1, x l ( t ) 5 90". Therefore maximizing throughput is equivalent to maximizing x l ( t ) which in turn is equivalent to setting u(t) f 45. The optimal controller can be obtained by combining the designs for safe and efficient operation. As safety takes precedence over efficiency the resulting controller will be:
where S = interior(V). By design, the controller of (11) will be safe. 
If
5 I"(G1;SO~) safe operation with a discrete controller will still be possible. This trivial example indicates how inter-agent communication (which can be used to provide such promises) can bias the game in the controllers favor and help the designer produce an acceptable design.
Concluding Remarks
We presented an approach to the design of hybrid controllers for complex systems which is ideally suited to a multi-agent setting. Game theory results were used to produce optimal continuous controllers and requirements on the discrete switching policy. The hybrid controller is guaranteed to meet certain performance specifications if the discrete part obeys these requirements. Our approach was illustrated on the train-gate controller problem.
The application of our methodology may be limited by technical problems such as lack of saddle solutions to the games. We hope to be able to extend older results in game theory and optimal control to derive conditions under which our algorithms can be applied. In addition we need to develop a technique for designing the discrete levels. The approach presented here only gives continuous designs and switching guidelines. The designer still has to come up with a discrete design that follows these guidelines. An interesting issue that needs to be addressed is what happens if the abstractions indicate that conflicting objectives (e.g. safety and efficiency) can not be met. As discussed earlier, the problem may still be solvable in this case by using inter-agent coordination. The role of coordination is to reduce the set of allowable disturbances generated by other agent actions, biasing the game in the controllers favor. The questions of how the discrete level should be designed to achieve sufficient coordination and where to draw the line between feasible and infeasible requirements are very interesting and require a lot of work to be answered.
